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Abstract
Many current technological devices used in our everyday lives confront us with
a host of new ethical issues to be addressed. Facebook, Twitter, or smart phones are
all examples of technologies used quite pervasively which call into question cultur-
ally significant values like privacy, among others. The embedded values concept
presents the compelling idea that engineers, scientists and designers can create
technologies which intentionally enhance cultural and societal values while at the
same time minimizing threats to other values. Although the embedded values con-
cept (and the resulting design theories that follow) is of great utility, it remains
unclear how to utilize this concept in practice. Added to this is the difficulty of
utilizing this concept when engaged in fundamental research or experiments rather
than in the creation of a commercial product. This paper presents a novel approach
for collaboration between an ethicist and a computer engineering PhD researcher
working on the Internet Bad Neighborhoods concept for spam filtering. The re-
sults proved beneficial in terms of both the utility of the embedded values concept
as well as a strengthening of the engineering PhD researcher’s work.
1 Introduction
Many current technological devices used in our everyday lives confront us with a host
of new ethical issues to be addressed. Social networking sites, like Facebook and Twit-
ter, are examples of technologies used on a daily basis that encourage us to reflect
on our conception of values like privacy, among others. The embedded values con-
cept in computer ethics [1] has drawn the attention of ethicists and designers alike to
the relationship between the design of technologies and the resulting ethics when the
technology is used[2, 3, 4].
We take the main argument of the embedded values concept as our starting point
but we claim that the predominant difficulty facing its uptake lies in exactly how this
can be done in practice. For example, how exactly does one conceptualize and translate
the values relevant to the creation of the technology in question in order for them to be
embedded?
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The purpose of this paper is to address the concept of embedded values by outlin-
ing a methodology in which ethicists and computer engineers can collaborate in order
to conceptualize values when research is still in the fundamental stages. To accom-
plish this, we will present the collaboration between an ethics advisor at a technical
research institute (van Wynsberghe) with a then Ph.D. candidate (Moura) at the Com-
puter Science department, working on a project investigating the concept of Internet
bad neighborhoods to improve network security [5]. Briefly, the main idea behind the
Internet bad neighborhood concept is that Internet traffic can be filtered based not only
on the source’s behavior, but on behavior of its surrounding neighborhood. For exam-
ple, an e-mail filter can classify a message from an unknown source solely based on
the sources neighbor’s behaviors.
In an interdisciplinary investigation, the authors worked together to scrutinize the
engineer’s intended values in the Internet neighborhood concept. Our steps were: mak-
ing intended values explicit, scrutinizing these values, and balancing values with con-
text in mind. The approach presented here is a novel approach to the research and
design of ICT systems, and it proved to be beneficial in both the justification of the
concept of embedded values, and value analysis in general, as well as strengthening
the integrity of the work of the engineer.
2 The embedded values concept
The relationship between the use of technologies and the idea that values are embed-
ded in technologies has only recently gained attention. It presents a compelling idea:
technologies can embed values such that when they are used certain values come into
existence [1]. For example, when Facebook users are using the social networking site,
the value of privacy comes into existence. This does not mean it is the conception
of privacy that all citizens would agree with but a certain conception of the value of
privacy is made real through the use of the platform.
From this comes the idea that if we agree with the claim made for embedded values,
then we can design technologies to intentionally promote certain values and minimize
threats to other values. This is a very powerful idea and is the driving force behind
Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) [6] and other value conscious design methods that aim
to incorporate value analysis into the design process. Taking the Facebook example
into consideration again, one might claim that a re-conceptualization of Facebook be
done for future applications and/or uses to minimize privacy threats of users.
Although the embedded values concept seems to be a promising concept for ad-
dressing the relationship between the use of technologies and the realization of values,
it still faces a host of criticisms[7, 8, 9]. Of particular interest for this paper is the latest
criticism addressing the disconnect between the intended values of engineers and the
values realized once the artifact is used in context [7, 8]. In other words, even when an
engineer may intend a value in the design of a technology this does not guarantee that
the value will be realized in practice.
3 Bridging the gap between Ethics and ICT research
and design
The main question of interest for this work is how to utilize the embedded values con-
cept when engaged in fundamental or experimental work rather than in a commercial
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or industrial setting.
The first step to embedding values in technologies is making those intended values
explicit. With this in mind value trade-offs must also be brought to the fore. A value
trade-off exists when the presence of one value minimizes the presence of another. This
forces the engineer to question whether or not such a trade-off can be justified.
The methods used here to bridge the gap in ethics and ICT research and design
are based on the work of an ethics adviser (van Wynsberghe), for a technical research
institute, CTIT (Center for Telematics and Information Technology). Her role as ethics
advisor has her committed to the incorporation of ethics into ICT research and design.
This may happen in a variety of ways and is dependent on: the kind of research (funda-
mental, experimental or the development of a product), the stage of development (i.e.,
the design process), the type of product, and the design team goals/wishes. That being
said, each collaboration centers on a value analysis involving: making intended values
explicit, questioning these values, and balancing values with context in mind (examin-
ing value trade-offs). For the work presented in this paper, the value analysis is done
using the concept and research of Internet bad neighborhoods and thus focuses on fun-
damental research (vs. the creation of a product) at the final stages in the development
stages.
4 The Internet bad neighborhood concept
The Internet is currently so important for the functioning of our society that it is actu-
ally considered part of the critical infrastructure of many countries [10]. Such depen-
dence has made the Internet very attractive for criminal organizations, nation states,
and activists as a medium in which crimes, cyber war, and protests can be carried out.
One example is spamming, in which cyber gangs generate massive amounts of spam
messages for various purposes (selling counterfeit drugs, spreading viruses, etc.). It
is estimated that 84-90% of all e-mail messages are spam nowadays [11, 12], which
ultimately leads to estimated losses of $10 billion to $87 billion yearly [13].
Behind these attacks, we find a large number of compromised computers, which
are typically computers in homes, schools, and businesses that have been “hijacked”
and carry out their malicious activities. This is done in a stealthy way so the human
user behind the desk does not notice their computer has been hijacked. Even though
these computers are distributed all over the world, they are, in fact, concentrated in
certain networks instead of being evenly distributed. Figure 1 shows the number of
spamming hosts per network in an experiment from [5] (/8 netlblock, in IP addressing
scheme1). As can be seen, some networks (or netblocks, x axis) exhibit higher numbers
of spamming hosts (y axis) than others. This resembles the distribution of crimes in the
real world. For example, Figure 2 shows that homicide locations are more concentrated
in certain neighborhoods in New York City than others.
With this in mind, if the New York Police Department (NYPD) wants to reduce
crime more efficiently, a starting point would be to improve police coverage where
the homicides are concentrated – for example, in neighborhoods like Brooklyn or the
Bronx. The same principle applies to bad neighborhoods on the Internet. If network
security engineers (analogous to the NYPD) want to reduce the incidence of attacks on
the Internet, they should start by tackling networks where attacks are more frequently
originated. Based on this, the Internet the bad neighborhood concept emerged [15].
1Please refer to [14] for a brief description on the subject matter.
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Figure 1: Number of spam Sources per /8 netblock
Figure 2: New York City Homicide Map (2003-2011) – Source: New York Police
Department
5 Value analysis of the Internet bad neighborhood con-
cept
To begin the ethical evaluation of the Internet bad neighborhood concept, three ethical
dimensions were uncovered to be addressed: 1. the labeling of malicious hosts, 2. the
labeling of bad neighborhoods and, 3. the deployment of the concept. The first two
categories pertain to the concept of Internet bad neighborhoods in general, independent
of any deployment of the concept, while the third category required a specific context
or deployment in mind in order to discuss.
A value analysis was then carried out for each of these three dimensions. Each
of the categories presented differing ethical considerations; however, what all three
did have in common was that they relied on a comparison between real world bad
neighborhoods and Internet bad neighborhoods. In other words, it became clear that
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Figure 3: Attribution Problem (adapted from Wheeler and Larsen [17])
the same manner in which individuals may suffer from bias or discrimination in the
real world, may be manifest on the Internet through the use of the concept.
5.1 The labeling of malicious hosts
The labeling of malicious hosts refers to how hosts are “flagged” as wrongdoers. In the
real world, lists of offenders are kept by police departments. On the Internet, however,
that is not a trivial task: in fact, most of attackers hijack computers online, so they
can pass by their victims unnoticed when carrying out attacks. To illustrate this, see
Figure 3, in which the real attacker (Attacker) attacks the Target computer em-
ploying a series of intermediate computers (St,Co, Zo, and Re) before reaching
its target. If the attack is noticed, it will be perceived by the Target as if it was
originated from the last host in the sequence (Zo or Re, depending on the chosen
path). In this case, an innocent computer system may be blacklisted by the Target,
while the original attacker might be thousands of miles away and escape unidentified2.
As a consequence, in this case, the legitimate user in Zo might not be able to send
legitimate e-mail to the mail server at the Target. This is known in the security
community as the attribution problem [17].
For this dimension, the intended value of the engineer was Internet security. The
main ethical concern for this dimension, however, had to do with the potential for
mistaken bias and prejudice, ultimately resulting in a minimization of the value of
fairness. Mistaken bias and prejudice had to do with what would happen to users who
had wrongfully been labeled as malicious hosts (Zo or Re) but who were innocent
bystanders – the attribution problem [17]. This is an example of a value trade-off – the
value of Internet security comes at the price of the value of fairness. To account for
this value trade-off, Moura relied on a utilitarian approach in ethics and claimed that
in order to provide the value of security to the greatest number of Internet users this
compromise would have to be made.
5.2 The labeling of bad neighborhoods
The labeling of bad neighborhoods refers to how hosts are clustered to form a bad
neighborhood. To illustrate this, see Figure 4, in which the target A is attacked by
hosts 3 and 4 (left side). In a traditional network security approach, both hosts could
2To make the attribution problem even more complex, the attacker may benefit from other network fea-
tures. Since the IP source address of the attackers is not used in the routing process, it may be easily forged,
which is commonly known as IP spoofing [16]. Other techniques can also be employed; for a more detailed
view on the matter, please refer to the work of Wheeler and Larsen [17].
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Figure 4: Aggregating Malicious Hosts into BadHoods
potentially be blacklisted, and any e-mail from both in the future would be potentially
rejected. However, by employing the bad neighborhood concept (right side of the
same figure), not only hosts 3 and 4 are blacklisted, but also their neighbors (1 and 2),
even though they have not previously sent any spam to A. In fact, it is like the whole
neighborhood has carried out the attack instead of the individual hosts.
For this ethical dimension, it was revealed that the intended value of the engineer
was once again Internet security. The ethicist, at this time, was concerned with the
reliability of the clustering of Internet bad neighborhoods and once again the potential
for mistaken bias and prejudice. Now, however, the mistaken bias and prejudice was
made worse given that an address could have mistakenly been labeled a malicious host
(i.e. the attribution problem [17]) and then all the neighboring addresses of the e alleged
“malicious” host were aggregated and labeled as a bad neighborhood. The question of
the ethicist at this time was: would it not be fairer to the public if IP addresses were
randomly assigned to a bad neighborhood? Would this not prevent a minimization of
fairness to labeled hosts? This question invites a discussion of what will happen once
the concept has been deployed. For this Moura and van Wynsberghe speculated on
potential future uses, users and outcomes as discussed below.
5.3 The deployment of the concept
Of particular interest here was that the computer engineer was conducting fundamental
research on the topic versus the creation of a commercial product. The deployment of
Bad neighborhood-based network filtering technologies would be the responsibility of
the software vendor. As discussed by the engineer[5], the bad neighborhood approach
is the “final” solution for Internet security problems, and should be employed as a
compliment to existing solutions. Consequently, envisioning the intended uses and
users was not the focus of the study; however, in order to understand the value trade-
offs and the intended values in general, a use context needed to be envisioned and
explored.
Added to the overarching intended value of Internet security the engineer intended
that the model be reliable, fair and effective. At this stage it is important to scrutinize
the intended values to ensure they are in fact desirable for society. In general, these
are all values considered relevant and desirable to society at large but the question
of greatest ethical importance for this paper is whether or not they would in fact be
realized and what other values were being traded-off to ensure these.
In making clear the ethical issues related to the first two dimensions and how they
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could become problematic once the technology was deployed the value trade-off be-
came clearer. In other words, if a company were to use this model and IP addresses
were labeled malicious which then meant that the neighboring addresses were also la-
beled malicious, what would happen to the emails sent from these addresses? Would
they bounce back to the sender or be thrown out without any indication of doing so?
What would happen if home systems that were also connected to the Internet (e.g,
fridges, satellite receivers, ADSL routers,etc.) were labeled as a malicious host, when
clearly it was not the original attacker, and all systems in the Internet neighborhood
were compromised without an indication of this being possible (meaning, no email
could be sent or passed on from the fridge). Where would responsibility fall when the
labeling had happened like this and still we do not know if the idea to cluster based on
address was in fact reliable?
Making the intended uses explicit and taking them into consideration it became
clear that the intended values of reliability, fairness and effectiveness may not be real-
ized once the concept was employed. Specifically, how could the claim be made that
the concept was reliable and effective if it might be just as effective to randomly as-
sign IP addresses to a bad neighborhood? Added to this, how could it be claimed that
the concept was fair to citizens if it could not be guaranteed that it was reliable and
effective? This conflict in values had not occurred to the engineer before this time.
6 Balancing value trade-offs
The fact that the intended values of reliability, effectiveness and fairness may not be
realized once the concept was deployed presented the engineer with a value conflict.
To account for this, the researcher conducted a series of additional experiments. These
additional tests were aimed at supporting the hypothesis that the methods for IP address
clustering were in fact statistically supported rather than based on an implicit hunch. In
fact, Moura verified in a series of experiments that by blacklisting individual hosts only,
the spam filter could only block 54% of the spam messages. In another comparison,
blocking these individuals plus randomly chosen hosts (not necessarily neighbors) did
not improve performance of the system. However, by blocking the individuals plus
their neighbors, the detection rate increased to 92%.
The results of the further testing to account for the conflict in values allowed the
engineer to address the disconnect in intended versus realized values. In other words,
by making explicit that Moura had intended certain values e.g., reliability, effective-
ness and fairness, in the Internet bad neighborhood concept these values could then be
scrutinized with the future potential deployment in mind. The results of the analysis
supported his assumption while at the same time allowed for the researcher to indicate
that he had considered the potential disvalue of discrimination but that this threat was
also minimized as much as possible. Thus, Moura was able to show that the intended
value of Internet security was balanced with the potential threat to fairness, bias or prej-
udice. These potential minimizations to fairness, bias and prejudice were only made
evident through examination with the ethicist.
This value analysis is of course not exhaustive but may be considered the first step
in a thorough ethical assessment to facilitate the accompaniment of ethics in ICT re-
search and design processes. What’s more, it presents a novel application of the em-
bedded values concept to fundamental research in an ICT institute.
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7 Conclusion
The embedded values concept presents the compelling idea that engineers, scientists
and designers can create technologies which intentionally enhance cultural and societal
values while at the same time minimizing threats to values. Although the embedded
values concept (and the resulting design theories that follow) is of great utility, it re-
mains unclear how to utilize this concept in practice. Added to this is the difficulty
of utilizing this concept when engaged in fundamental research or experiments rather
than in the creation of a commercial product.
The first step in value analysis, as presented here, involves making explicit the in-
tended values of the engineers and/or design team. By making intended values explicit
we were able to scrutinize these values i.e. to question whether or not the intended
values would be realized in practice. What’s more, we also made it clear that although
these values may be realized in context the technology also poses a threat to other
values like freedom from bias and/or discrimination. Accordingly, the Internet bad
neighborhood concept provided an example of the difficulty of embedding values in
technology: that the intended values come with value trade- offs and that the technol-
ogy may be used in a manner that invites other values or dis-values.
Of equal importance is to scrutinize the intended values to ensure that these are in
fact the correct values to embed. This too requires in-depth ethical insight as discussed
in this paper and was conducted for this research project but was not the focus of this
particular paper. Specifically, the goal was to show the difficulty in making values
explicit along with the goal of showing the connection between the implicit intended
values of engineers and whether these values would be realized in context once the
technology was deployed.
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